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14.1 Introduction and Summary
The reform of public pension systems has become an increasingly ur-
gent topic on the political agenda in most Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries, because during recent
years it has become more and more evident that, given the progressive
aging of the population, existing pension plans are ﬁscally unsustainable
under prevailing rules—albeit to diﬀering degrees (see OECD 1995a;
Noord and Herd 1993; Chand and Jaeger 1996). Against that background,
the purpose of this paper is to give an account of the present state of the
matter in an international perspective, centering on the industrial coun-
tries. The remainder of this section summarizes the main ﬁndings of the
country-by-country analysis that follows in subsequent sections. Section
14.2 brieﬂy sketches the main characteristics of the pension systems of
seventeen industrial countries and gives information on recent reforms. In
section 14.3, developments in other parts of the world (namely in Central
and Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Latin America) are covered, although
in a much more general way.1 The paper ends with some concluding re-
marks.
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43914.1.1 Institutional Design Diﬀers across Countries
Generally, retirement income can be provided from three sources: public
pension schemes, privately managed (but usually government-regulated)
occupational pension schemes, and individual (retirement) saving. Across
countries, there is a great deal of variation in the relative importance of
these three sources of income as well as in the institutional organization
of each of them. Diﬀerences in the organization of the pension systems
are one reason behind the fact that the problems facing pension systems
for the future are more serious in some countries than in others.2
Table 14.1 summarizes facts over a number of dimensions of the institu-
tional design of old age pension systems in seventeen OECD countries.
The relative importance of public pension schemes is to some extent re-
ﬂected in the level of public pension expenditure relative to gross domestic
product (GDP), and is related to the ratio of average pensions to average
wages (the implicit replacement rate). According to these indicators, the
role of the public sector is especially prominent in continental Europe
(with the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Denmark as the exceptions) and
tends to be less pronounced in the Anglo-Saxon countries.3 The present
value of uncovered future liabilities in the public-sector pension system as
a percentage of GDP may give an indication of the extent to which reforms
are necessary. As a measure of the relative weight of occupational pensions
in the overall old age security system, the percentage of employees covered
can be misleading when occupational pension plans are designed to pro-
vide only a marginal addition to other (public) pensions. This is the case,
for example, in Germany. Therefore, the importance of occupational pen-
sion plans may be better reﬂected in the value of accumulated assets mea-
sured as a proportion of GDP.4
In most industrial countries, a mandatory public pension plan is at the
heart of the old age security system. Formal arrangements, however, can
diﬀer in a number of ways. Pension schemes may have either redistribution
or saving and insurance as dominant objectives. They may specify either
their beneﬁts in advance (deﬁned beneﬁt type), or their contributions and
pay beneﬁts according to the return on the contributions (deﬁned contri-
bution type). They may be ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go basis (from gen-
eral tax revenues or from social security contributions), or on a largely
funded basis.
2. Of course, the diﬀering degree of population aging is another important factor.
3. For Japan and New Zealand, the assessment is somewhat unclear because a relatively
low share of GDP spent on public pensions combines with a relatively high implicit replace-
ment rate.
4. Mandatory occupational pension schemes that work (primarily) on a PAYGO basis are
included in the public sector even if private-sector institutions are involved in the manage-
ment of the system. Such arrangements can be found in Finland and France.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.In reality, we ﬁnd basically two diﬀerent approaches to public pension
schemes. The ﬁrst is the social insurance approach, which can be found in
most continental countries of western Europe, in the United States, and in
Japan. Here, the working generation is required to contribute to the system
a certain percentage of a relevant income, and beneﬁts are related to con-
tributions or earnings (or both). The countries that have public pension
schemes at work according to the social insurance approach again diﬀer
signiﬁcantly with respect to the arrangements in detail—for example, the
degree of redistribution inherent in the system, the coverage of the popula-
tion, and the proportion of retirement income that is supplied by the sys-
tem. Another diﬀerence concerns funding. Although ﬁnancing is, in prin-
ciple, pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) across the board, in some countries (such
as the United States or Japan) it works eﬀectively on a partially funded
basis because contribution rates, having been deliberately set beyond what
is needed to ﬁnance current pension expenditure, allow the accumulation
of funds that can be used in the years when the strong cohorts are to retire.
The other approach to social security dominates in the Anglo-Saxon
countries (with the major exception of the United States) and in Scandina-
via. The public pension in this approach, originally designed as a ﬂat-rate
beneﬁt that provides a ﬂoor for old age income, is ﬁnanced by ﬂat-rate
contributions or general tax revenues. Retirement income exceeding this
basic beneﬁt should, in principle, be provided privately. Over time, how-
ever, an earnings-related part has usually been added. This has led to an
increased importance of the public pension schemes for the overall old age
security system and has reduced the actual diﬀerence between the two
approaches to some extent.
As concerns the second important source of retirement income, occupa-
tional pensions, countries diﬀer in a number of aspects, including the ar-
rangement as deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) or deﬁned contribution (DC) plans, the
adjustment for inﬂation, regulations on investment (which aﬀect risk and
return), and relevant rules in the tax code, which make it more or less
attractive for a ﬁrm to oﬀer a pension fund. Of particular importance for
the outcome in terms of coverage is that in some countries, namely in
Australia, Switzerland, and increasingly Denmark, the enrollment in occu-
pational pension schemes is mandatory, whereas it is voluntary in the other
countries. An additional factor is whether it is possible to contract out of
public earnings-related schemes; this is the case in the United Kingdom
and in Japan. The relative role of occupational pensions as a source of
retirement income is found to be dependent on the scale of public pension
provision, especially if there is generous provision for individuals with
higher income levels (Davis 1998). The replacement of a rather high share
of earnings through the public pension system for medium- and high-
income earners, as is the case for example in Germany, France, and Italy,
tends to reduce incentives to provide for additional sources of retirement
444 Klaus-Ju ¨rgen Gernincome. By contrast, the role for additional pillars is likely to increase,
when the replacement rate of public pensions decreases strongly with ris-
ing income so that the pensions are more like ﬂat beneﬁts, which is the
case, for example, in the Netherlands or in Switzerland.
With respect to the third pillar of retirement income—individual volun-
tary saving—there is lack of data that can to some extent be traced to the
fact that it is diﬃcult to discriminate between saving for retirement and
other saving. It seems safe to say, however, that the extent of voluntary
retirement saving is negatively inﬂuenced by the amount of saving that is
already “forced” by the arrangements in the ﬁrst and second pillars.5 An-
other inﬂuence is the tax treatment of income saved for retirement.
14.1.2 Recent Reforms in Industrial Countries
Recent reforms6 made to adjust to the pressures of the changing eco-
nomic and demographic environment have essentially proceeded along
three routes: (1) redressing the public pension systems; (2) strengthening
the role of funded occupational pension schemes; and (3) increasing incen-
tives for voluntary retirement saving.
Almost every country surveyed has made public pension reforms of
some signiﬁcance to improve the ﬁnancial prospects of the system. One
direction of reform was eﬀectively reducing the level of beneﬁts through a
number of measures: The period of earnings referred to in the calculation
of beneﬁts has been increased (Belgium, Finland, France, Netherlands,
Spain); basic beneﬁts have increasingly been made subject to an income
test (Canada, Finland, Sweden); and indexation rules have been changed
(Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden). As a further
measure to contain the rise in pension expenditure, the statutory retire-
ment age will gradually be raised in a number of countries (Germany, Italy,
Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the US,), and eligibility rules
for early retirement have been tightened in most countries. In addition,
sometimes as part of a general tendency to strengthen the link between
contributions and beneﬁts and improve actuarial fairness, steps have been
taken to reduce the attractiveness of early retirement and reward a longer
working life. Another direction that has been followed by a number of
countries is to increase prefunding of future pension expenditure. In some
countries, a gradual increase in the rate of contribution has been legislated
beyond what would have been necessary to immediately balance the sys-
tem’s ﬁnances in order to partially fund future liabilities (the United States,
Japan, Canada). Other countries have decided to divert a certain share of
contributions into funds (Finland, Sweden), which in the case of Sweden
5. Voluntary saving will be aﬀected less when the promised pension beneﬁts implicit in
current rules are not credible.
6. A sketchy overview of reform measures is given in the last column of table 14.1
Recent Developments in Old-Age Pension Systems 445(and in the future, according to recent plans, in the United States) are
personal accounts. In Germany, private pension funds will be integrated
into the public pension system, but on a voluntary basis.
A second route of reform has been to increase the importance of fully
funded, privately managed occupational pensions. One way to achieve this
is to reduce the generosity of public pension beneﬁts, and hence, to reduce
the attractiveness of these schemes. There have also been important
changes in the regulations concerning occupational pensions. In several
cases (Australia, Denmark, Switzerland), occupational pensions have
been made compulsory. Other countries enable individuals to opt out of
part of their social security contributions (the United Kingdom, Japan).
A further direction has been to allow additional types of pension schemes
to be operated. In particular, there has been a tendency to favor the estab-
lishment of DC over DB plans (Australia, Denmark, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, the United States) in order to make occupational pen-
sion schemes more attractive, especially for smaller ﬁrms, and to reduce
the problem of portability.7 On the investment side, there is a clear ten-
dency to ease restrictions on investment of funds, which are now recog-
nized to contribute to increasing risk by limiting the possibility of diversi-
ﬁcation rather than to foster “prudent” investment behavior. Particularly,
the allowed share of equity in the portfolio has been increased, and restric-
tions on cross-border investments have been eased in countries such as
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, and Sweden. External
fundingofliabilitiesisincreasinglytherule,withJapan,forexample,reduc-
ing the tax beneﬁts to book reserve funding relative to external funding.
As for the third pillar of retirement income, the tax treatment of retire-
ment saving has been improved in some countries. In Italy and Spain, in
particular, tax incentives have rather recently been introduced.
14.1.3 More Radical Reforms in Middle-Income Countries
Although reforms in the industrial countries have been rather gradual
in most cases (as will be the impact of these changes), an increasing num-
ber of middle-income countries have, in the face of a more imminent pres-
sure to reform, resorted to a more radical transition toward a multipillar
system involving a major funded element. In Latin America in recent
years, countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Uru-
guay have followed the pioneering example of Chile. Others are engaged
in serious discussions. More countries that are about to implement pension
reforms along similar lines can be found in Central and Eastern Europe,
including Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland. The experiences of these
countries lead to the conclusion that at some stage a radical approach to
reform may be more feasible than gradual adjustment. The considerable
7. Another reason to favor DC plans may have been the risk of default that is inherent in
DB plans.
446 Klaus-Ju ¨rgen Gernvariation in the details of the pension systems that are to be established as
well as in the details of the transition can be explained in part by country-
to-country diﬀerences with respect to objectives, history, and current cir-
cumstances, particularly the relative strengths of redistributive and saving
goals, ﬁnancial market development, and taxing and regulatory capacities
(James 1997). However, comparative evaluation of the pension reforms in
these countries can be expected to give further empirical evidence on the
shape of a well-designed pension reform.
14.1.4 Summary: Toward Increased Funding
There is a clear tendency toward reforms that increase the degree of
prefunding of pension obligations. Numerous countries have proceeded
signiﬁcantly along that route, be it through stronger funding in the public
pension schemes (Canada, Finland, Sweden, the United States) or through
strengthening the role of private occupational pensions (Australia, Den-
mark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom). Measures such
as these that tend to lessen the burden on future generations have resulted
in a current burden somewhat higher than it would have been without
such reforms—despite the fact that measures to restrain expenditure were
also taken. In some countries, contribution rates are raised beyond what
would have been necessary without increased funding; in other countries,
subsidies to the system from general tax revenues are increased. To this
end, it can be said that the consolidation of general government ﬁnances
(excluding social security) can greatly contribute to the viability of a major
switch to funded pensions. This can be also concluded from the experience
of the increasing number of middle-income countries that have imple-
mented rather sweeping reforms. Other industrial counties have conﬁned
their reforms mainly to more or less signiﬁcant adjustments to the prevail-
ing PAYGO systems, without increasing the funded element (Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Spain). The capacity
of the conventional measures to redress these systems in order to balance
their ﬁnances in the long term, however, seems limited.
14.2 Pension Systems and Pension Reforms in Industrial Countries
14.2.1 Australia
The Australian government has introduced a three-pillar system very
similar to that recommended by the World Bank (1994; Bateman and Pig-
gott 1997). It consists of a basic, tax-ﬁnanced state pension (age pension),
which is means tested.8 The pension for an individual is a ﬂat 25 percent
8. Since the Age Pension was introduced in 1909, it was subject to income or property
tests that changed over time. In the 1970s, the means test was abolished for those over the
age of seventy, but during the 1980s an income test for all age pensions was reintroduced in
combination with an asset test (Knox 1995, 107).
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around 3 percent of GDP (Edey 1997, 169). The eligibility age is sixty-ﬁve
for men and sixty for women, and the pension is indexed to consumer
prices (Rosenman and Warburton 1996).
Since 1986, Australia has been gradually introducing a second pillar, an
obligatory (since 1992) private insurance that is fully funded and ﬁnanced
primarily from employer contributions, which are scheduled to reach 9
percent of wages in the year 2002. In addition, employee contributions will
be 3 percent in the year 2000. The contributions are paid into an individual
account that belongs to the employee and are tax deductible. Low-wage
earners’ contributions are supplemented by the state. A third pillar is vol-
untary saving or voluntary occupational pension schemes, which also re-
ceive some preferential tax treatment.
One main reason for the move of the Australian government toward a
compulsory superannuation was the desire for a wider coverage of occupa-
tional old age insurance, because occupational pension schemes have tra-
ditionally been an important source of retirement income. Since the intro-
duction of the scheme, private-sector coverage has risen from about 30
percent to some 90 percent of employees. The transition has been rela-
tively easy because many of the features of the superannuation industry
remain as they were when coverage was voluntary,9 and the transition has
not been complicated by the existence of a contributory public-sector pen-
sion scheme with unfunded liabilities.
One problem with the Australian system is that it has produced substan-
tial uncertainty because, although it was established only recently, there
have been frequent changes to the provisions of the system and to the tax
treatment of both contributions and beneﬁts (Knox 1995). An additional
problem is the integration of the various pillars in a rational, equitable, and
sustainable way. Speciﬁcally, the question of means-tested versus universal
basic pension beneﬁts has so far been resolved in Australia in favor of a
means test. However, the retirement age of the compulsory superannua-
tion has not been aligned with the pension age, nor is it required to take
the superannuation entitlement in the form of a pension. Thus, incentives
remain to retire early and become eligible for the age pension after dissipa-
tation of some of the individual’s superannuation beneﬁt.
14.2.2 Austria
The Austrian old age pension system closely resembles the German sys-
tem. It is basically earnings related and does not provide a minimum pen-
sion, although the principle of contribution equivalency has been weak-
9. Most of the older (voluntary) plans that remain in existence have been of the DB type,
whereas the newer plans introduced in response to government requirement are of the DC
type.
448 Klaus-Ju ¨rgen Gernened by various provisions that introduce a rather strong redistributionary
element into the system. One-fourth of expenditures are covered by gen-
eral tax revenues to compensate for expenditures that result from such
redistribution. The ﬁnancing is PAYGO, and pensions are indexed to net
wages, although the increase of consumer prices serves as a bottom limit.
The statutory retirement age is at sixty-ﬁve for men and sixty for women.
Austria’s public pension payments represent more than 15 percent of
GDP—the highest number among the industrialized countries (World
Bank 1994)—mainly because of a relatively high beneﬁts level; the re-
placement rate is at 76 percent on average, with signiﬁcantly higher num-
bers for some groups of workers (Guger 1998). The contribution rate paid
by employers and employees (with the exception of civil servants) is 22.8
percent with a maximum contribution threshold.
The future problems for the system due to the aging of the population
are particularly alarming. One reason is that the demographic develop-
ments are slightly more unfavorable than on average in the OECD coun-
tries. A second problem is that the present burden of the system on the
economy is already relatively large. Balancing the system by the year 2045
would require a contribution rate of more than 35 percent, a reduction of
the replacement rate to less than 50 percent, an increase in the retirement
age by more than ten years, or a combination of these. A signiﬁcant reform
has not yet been implemented, although the pension reform of 1993 in-
cluded the change of indexation from gross to net wages. Recently, there
has been some discussion on further steps to secure the viability of the
system, but proposals are mainly restricted to adjustments within the sys-
tem (Ru ¨rup 1997). Measures have concentrated on reducing the preferen-
tial treatment of public-sector employees but have not been convincing
(Lenhardt 1997). Recently, the increased incidence of early retirement
came into focus. There was an increase in the number of years used to
calculate the pension in the case of early retirement, from the last ﬁfteen
to the last eighteen years. The pension reform decided upon in 2000, which
otherwise contains only minor changes, went further in reducing the incen-
tives for early retirement.
14.2.3 Belgium
The Belgian public pension10 system is on a PAYGO basis. It consists of
four major schemes: one for civil servants, one for wage earners, and one
for the self-employed, as well as a guaranteed minimum-income scheme.
There is a supplementary pillar of occupational pensions, which is of lim-
ited signiﬁcance although some 30 percent of the workforce are covered;
accumulated assets amount to about 10 percent of GDP (OECD 1994c).
Private retirement insurance is available but has so far been limited in size.
10. This section draws on de Callatay and Turtelboom (1997).
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social security contributions of 16.36 percent of gross income (7.50 per-
cent by the employee another 8.86 percent by the employer), plus a govern-
ment subsidy amounting to about one percent of GDP. The level of pen-
sions paid depends on the individual’s salary during his or her entire career
(with an imputed salary used for periods of illness, unemployment, etc.),
the length of the career, and the individual’s marital status when retired.
Pensions are indexed to the consumer price index (CPI). Although there
is a ceiling on earnings used to calculate the pension, there is no ceiling
on contributions. Because the ceiling on pensionable income is rather
low—about 20 percent above the average wage—the tax component of
the social security contributions is rather large. Because the ceiling is in-
dexed to the CPI and real wage growth is not accounted for, the pension
scheme is gradually moving toward a ﬂat basic pension scheme.
Pensions for public-sector employees are paid from the general govern-
ment budget. Retirement age is sixty to sixty-ﬁve years. The retirement
pension depends on the reference salary, the career length, and the replace-
ment rate (which is dependent on the career length), and is subject to a
maximum. There is also a minimum pension diﬀerentiated according to
household structure. The pension scheme for the public sector is more
generous than the private-sector scheme because, for one reason, pensions
are eﬀectively indexed to wages rather than to CPI.
A minor reform undertaken in 1996 will raise, over the course of the
next ﬁfteen years, the career length necessary for women to receive the full
pension beneﬁt from forty to forty-ﬁve years—the minimum career al-
ready eﬀective for men. Retirement age at which the full pension can be
drawn is between sixty and sixty-ﬁve, provided that the required number
of years has been worked.11
14.2.4 Canada
The Canadian public pension system has two tiers. The ﬁrst is ﬁnanced
from tax revenues and is designed to put a ﬂoor on old age income. It
consists of a basic universal grant (Old Age Security [OAS]) and income-
tested supplements (the Guaranteed Income Supplement [GIS] and
Spouse’s Allowance [SPA]). The beneﬁts are indexed to CPI and are not
taxable. They are payable from the age of sixty-ﬁve (and from the age of
sixty to sixty-ﬁve for widows of OAS pensions in the case of SPA). The
second tier is an earnings-related pension scheme (Canada and Quebec
Pension Plans), which are PAYGO ﬁnanced12 by compulsory contributions
11. Before 1991 it was sixty-ﬁve years of age for men and sixty for women, and the pension
was reduced by 5 percent for each year of retirement before reaching this statutory retire-
ment age.
12. The Canada Pension Plan has in the past accumulated a fund amounting to roughly 7
percent of GDP.
450 Klaus-Ju ¨rgen Gernfrom employers, employees, and the self-employed. The contribution rate
is presently at 6.1 percent of covered earnings, split equally between em-
ployees and employers.13 Beneﬁts replace 25 percent of average lifetime
earnings, but combined with the OAS, the beneﬁt schedule is steeply pro-
gressive (i.e., the replacement ratio declines strongly with increasing earn-
ings). Beneﬁts are taxable and indexed to consumer prices. The statutory
retirement age is sixty-ﬁve, but it is possible to retire as early as age sixty
with an actuarial reduction of the beneﬁt. In addition, there are tax incen-
tives to engage in registered private pension plans, which are a relatively
important source of retirement income in Canada. In 1992, 47.5 percent
of workers were covered by occupational pensions (Gruber 1997, 13).
At 5 percent of GDP, public pension expenditure at present is relatively
modest in international comparison; one reason is that public pensions
replace a relatively small share of working-age income. The expenditure
ratio has doubled over the past 25 years, however, and is projected to rise
to more than 9 percent of GDP by 2030, partly as a result of a particularly
steep rise in the old age dependency ratio.14 Although expenditure on the
ﬁrst tier of the public pension system currently represents about one-half
of total outlays, the debate has focused on the second tier because the
increase in expenditure stems mainly from this part of the public pension
system. It is expected that contribution rates will have to triple in the ab-
sence of reforms to keep the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) in balance.
In order to keep the CPP solvent, increases in the contribution rate to
7.9 percent in 2005 and to 9.9 percent in 2025 have already been legislated
(Kramer and Li 1997, 7), but this will be insuﬃcient without further re-
form. In 1997, a reform proposal was drafted that consisted of increased
prefunding through an increase of the contribution rate to 9.9 percent as
early as 2003. Further measures included a revision of the regulations on
the investment of social security funds to raise the rate of return on these
funds, a tightening of eligibility criteria, and lower beneﬁts. The combina-
tion of these measures is projected to allow the contribution rate to be
held constant after the year 2003.
Other important changes relate to the ﬁrst-tier beneﬁts (OAS, GIS, and
SPA). It is envisaged to replace these beneﬁts through a single Seniors
Beneﬁt from the year 2001. The essential feature of the Seniors Beneﬁt is
that it is more targeted than the old system, while at the same time it
increases the guaranteed minimum income for pensioners (OECD 1996c,
13. There is both a basic exemption and an upper limit to pensionable earnings.
14. Of the diﬀerence between the contribution rate that had been projected for the year
2030 at the time of the introduction of the 1966 Canada Pension Plan—5.5 percent—and
the currently expected 14.5 percent, only 30 percent is attributable to demographic develop-
ments. Another 25 percent is attributable to revisions in the underlying macroeconomic as-
sumptions. The remainder can be attributed to the enrichment of beneﬁts and to higher
disability beneﬁts (OECD 1996c, 126).
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can choose either the new Seniors Beneﬁt or the old system for the rest of
their lives (Battle 1996).
14.2.5 Denmark
The Danish pension system consists of a tax-ﬁnanced general basic pen-
sion replacing about 38 percent of an average wage (Danish Ministry of
Economic Aﬀairs 2000; Barnes 1997). The amount can be supplemented
subject to an income test. Adding to the basic old age pension is a compul-
sory national pension scheme, Arbejdsmarkedets Tillaegspension (ATP),
which is fully funded and of a DC type. Contributions are based on hours
worked, but are fairly low,15 so that the share of the ATP pension in retire-
ment income will be fairly low when the system that was established in
1964 ﬁrst matures in the early years of the next century.
In addition to the public pension schemes, most salaried employees con-
tribute to fully funded DC pension plans established through the collective
bargaining system.16 In the beginning of the 1990s, employers and trade
unions agreed to extend the coverage to virtually all workers. Contribu-
tions will gradually rise to about 9 percent of gross wages. The collective
saving schemes are legally independent of the companies whose employees
are covered, and the saving belongs to the individuals.
To promote further individual provision for retirement income there is
a tax deduction for saving in private pension plans. However, a tax of 40
percent is levied when this saving is withdrawn. Despite this fact, individ-
ual pension plans are a popular form of saving (Barnes 1997).
With a major part of the pension system organized in fully funded DC
schemes, the threat of an aging population is less pronounced in Denmark
than in other countries. Recent reforms have been concerned with ex-
tending the coverage of occupational pension schemes. In 1999, the early
retirement allowance scheme was changed to reduce incentives for early
retirement. At the same time, the retirement age in the basic pension
scheme was reduced from sixty-seven to sixty-ﬁve years. Discussion about
a reform of the tax-ﬁnanced basic pension involves in particular the ques-
tion of introducing an income test (Gamillscheg 1997).
14.2.6 Finland
The Finnish public pension system consists of two pillars (OECD 1997e,
67ﬀ). One is a basic pension (national pension), which is comparatively
low (and supplemented from general tax revenues in the event of no other
income); the other is a compulsory employment scheme granting earnings-
15. In 1995, the contribution for a full-time worker was 2,332 Danish krone a year, or a
little more than one percent of an ordinary annual income (Barnes 1995).
16. Some central government civil-service pension schemes still work on a PAYGO basis,
but they are being discontinued.
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ﬁnanced by contributions on a PAYGO basis; although the employment
scheme is managed by more than sixty private pension institutions. The
employment scheme is also ﬁnanced by contributions, but it is partially
funded: Financial assets cover roughly one-third of the present pension
obligations (Noord 1997). The national pension tends to decrease as the
occupational pension increases; except for low-wage earners, the combina-
tion of both replaces a maximum of 60 percent of pensionable income.
The statutory retirement age is sixty-ﬁve years, but the average retirement
age is only ﬁfty-eight years due to disability or early-retirement schemes.
Due to the generous beneﬁt levels and a virtually universal coverage of the
population by the public pension system, the market share of voluntary
pension insurance has until recently been very small.
Against the background of pronounced population aging, relatively gen-
erous beneﬁts, a low eﬀective retirement age, and a general erosion of the
tax base due to the recession in the early 1990s, a relatively far-reaching
reform of the system was implemented in several steps during recent years.
Without changes, the pension expenditure had been estimated to reach
nearly 18 percent of GDP by the year 2030—a level exceeded only in Italy
(OECD 1996b).
The main objectives of the pension reform were to promote longer work-
ing careers, to reduce beneﬁts, and to improve the management of the
pension funds, all the while maintaining the basic features of the system:
its two-tier approach, its mixture of funding and PAYGO ﬁnancing, its pro-
nounced redistribution, and the strong involvement of private insurers in
the management of the system.
The major components of reform have been the following (OECD
1997e, 76ﬀ; Noord 1997):
● Discontinuation of preferential treatment for public-sector employ-
ees (1993).
● Measures to improve the pensions of older workers who remain active
relative to those of workers who retire early (1994 and 1996).
● Increase in the number of years on which the calculation of pensions
is based, from the last four years to the last ten years (1996).
● Change in the indexation of earnings-related pensions to a weighted
average of CPI (80 percent) and earnings index (20 percent). National
(basic) pensions remain indexed to CPI (1996).
● Decision gradually to abolish the ﬂat rate component of national pen-
sions by the end of the decade. Future national pensions will be fully
oﬀset against employment pensions.
● Adjustment of the funding method of the employment pensions, since
1993; also since 1993, employees contribute to the system. Roughly
three-ﬁfths of the contributions are used to ﬁnance current pension
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tions. A number of measures aim at raising the eﬃciency of the ﬁ-
nancing of the system.
As a result of these reforms, the rise in contributions necessary to balance
the system is now expected to be contained at roughly 26 percent of earn-
ings (from 21.4 percent currently), compared to an estimated 38 percent
under prereform rules. Current policies concentrate on increasing the
eﬀective retirement age. To this end, a National Program on Aging Work-
ers for the years 1998–2002 was designed, and in 2000 the lower age limit
for individual early retirement pensions was raised from ﬁfty-eight to
sixty years.
14.2.7 France
In France, the pension system (OECD 1994a) comprises a large number
of PAYGO schemes (about 120 basic schemes and 400 supplementary
ones). The system diﬀerentiates between private-sector and public-sector
employees (including some categories of workers such as railway workers,
miners,Electricite ´ deFranceemployees,etc.).Theprivatesectorconsistsof
a two-level system—the general and the supplementary levels—whereas
the public-sector pensions are usually one-level. Retirement age, contribu-
tion rates, and calculation of beneﬁts may vary considerably between dif-
ferent schemes (Kaufmann 1997). The ordinary retirement age, introduced
in 1982, is sixty. Funded pension schemes play only a very minor role.
In 1993, the ﬁrst major eﬀort to reform the public pension system aimed
at the method of calculating pensions in the general scheme of the private
sector (Darnant 1997). It included
● An increase in the contribution period necessary to receive the full-
rate pension from 37.5 years to 40.0 years;
● An increase in the number of years used to calculate the reference
wage, from ten to twenty-ﬁve;
● A change in indexation from wage growth to CPI; and
● Creation of a separate fund to ﬁnance noncontributory old age bene-
ﬁts resulting from national solidarity.
The eﬀect of the 1993 reform is rather limited. Although it improves ﬁ-
nancial prospects until 2005, it leaves many questions unresolved, particu-
larly the sustainability of the public-sector “special schemes.” A proposal
aimed at reforming public-sector pensions had to be withdrawn in 1995
following strikes in the public sector. Given that demographic develop-
ments are relatively beneﬁcial until 2005 but worsen progressively after-
ward, the main problems are still to be solved.
In 1997, a law passed the National Assembly that would have allowed
employers and employees to contribute to fully funded private pension
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was voluntary, but there were generous ﬁscal incentives to contribute up
to a certain level. The aim was to strengthen the role of privately managed,
capital funded pension schemes. However, after the change of government,
legislation came to a halt and the law never went into eﬀect.
Recently, the discussion centered on increasing the retirement age to
sixty-ﬁve, following the publication of a report on the long-term prospects
of the pension system commissioned by the government (the so-called
Charpin Report). A peculiarity of the French situation is that despite the
obvious demographic developments and a worldwide trend toward in-
creasing the retirement age, there used to be a strong demand to go in
the opposite direction and to decrease further the retirement age—which
already is among the lowest in the world—to ﬁfty-ﬁve. This attitude in the
public, however, may be about to change with the recent pronounced de-
cline of unemployment.
14.2.8 Germany
The provision of old age pensions in Germany is dominated by the pub-
lic system, which provides roughly 85 percent of pensions. Voluntary occu-
pational pension schemes, although they cover some 50 percent of employ-
ees, provide only 5 percent of pensions. About 10 percent of pensions
come from life insurance (OECD 1996d). Old age insurance in the public
pension scheme (Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung, or GRV) is compulsory
for employees other than civil servants, whose pensions are paid out of
general tax revenue, and voluntary for the self-employed. The system is
PAYGO ﬁnanced by contributions levied on gross wages at the rate of 19.1
percent (2001), and a transfer from the federal budget that currently covers
about one-fourth of pension outlays. The statutory retirement age is sixty-
ﬁve, but employees may retire earlier if they have long contribution records
(at the age of sixty-three), if they are handicapped (at the age of sixty), or
if they are unemployed prior to retirement (at the age of sixty). Women
also may retire at age sixty if they fulﬁll certain eligibility criteria. As a
result of these rules, more than half of the work force retires before the
statutory retirement age.
A major adjustment to the system was made in 1992 to cope with the
ﬁnancial burden of a rising old age dependency ratio (SVR 1991, 142). In
particular, the retirement age for women will be raised gradually to sixty-
ﬁve from 2001, and beneﬁts for pensioners who retire early were reduced.17
Most importantly, the adjustment of pensions was changed from index-
ation to gross wages to indexation to net wages. Pension beneﬁts are calcu-
lated according to a formula that is designed to replace 70.1 percent of
17. The 1992 pension reform has diminished (but not abolished) the incentives for early
retirement (Bo ¨rsch-Supan 1998).
Recent Developments in Old-Age Pension Systems 455average net wages during a forty-ﬁve-year working career (67.8 percent in
East Germany).
Despite the reform of 1992, the public pension system’s viability re-
mained in doubt due to the progressive aging of the population. To combat
the expected increase in pension expenditure (from slightly more than 11
percent of GDP in 1995 to almost 19 percent of GDP in 2035; OECD
1996d, 71), which, without other changes, would require an increase in the
contribution rate to nearly 30 percent in 2030, a further reform package
was legislated to take eﬀect in 1999 (Verband Deutscher Rentenversicher-
ungstra ¨ger [VDR] 1997). The main feature of the 1999 reform act was to
reduce the ratio of pensions to net wages gradually, according to a demo-
graphic factor reﬂecting the increase in life expectancy of new retirees. A
ratio of 64 percent was projected to be reached in about three decades.
The reform package, which included additional measures to increase the
eﬀective retirement age, lay in the general direction outlined by the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisors (SVR 1996, 227), but it responded to the need
for reform to only a limited extent (SVR 1997, 98). More importantly, it
was rejected by the opposition parties as being distributionally unaccept-
able and dismissed after the change in government before taking eﬀect.
The new center-Left government’s ﬁrst measures toward pensions were
of a stop-gap nature, aimed at reducing the contribution rate while at the
same time improving the state of public ﬁnances. They consisted of in-
creasing the federal subsidy with funds raised from a stepwise increase in
energy taxes (the so-called ecological tax reform) and of an exceptional
adjustment of pensions in line with consumer price inﬂation rather than
net wages in 2000 and 2001, which will result in a decline of the replace-
ment ratio by nearly 2 percentage points.
A major pension reform geared at coping with the long-term challenges
was presented in 2000 and becomes eﬀective in 2002. The basic idea of
the reform is to reduce the replacement ratio of the public pension scheme
over the years to 68 percent of wages,18 and at the same time to introduce
a funded private pillar that, when in its mature phase, is expected to supply
an additional 6 percent of wages. The contribution rate to the private pen-
sion funds will be 1 percent in the ﬁrst year, and will be increased by 1
percentage point every two years to reach a ﬁnal 4 percent in 2008. The
contributions are to be ﬁnanced exclusively by employees. Although con-
tributing to the private pillar is not compulsory, the contributions will
lower the net wage and enter the calculation of pension rights in any event.
The pension funds can be integrated with occupational or individual
18. It should be noted that the reform includes a change in the deﬁnition of the net wage.
The positive eﬀect of tax reductions—such as those legislated to take eﬀect in 2005—on net
wages will be excluded in the calculation of this new synthetic net wage. As a result, the
pension level relative to the actual net wages will decline more strongly, to around 64 percent.
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a federal subsidy will be granted.
The reform is projected to keep the contribution rate to the public pen-
sion scheme below 20 percent until 2020, and below 22 percent until 2030.
Including the contributions to the new private pillar, the contribution rate
will reach 26 percent by 2030, which is a rate similar to the rate expected
without reform, albeit at a somewhat higher level of pensions. Hence, the
reform has only partly succeeded in reducing the burden of the aging pop-
ulation and balancing the ﬁnances of the public pension system in the long
term. Proposals for other kinds of reform that include an increase of the
retirement age to seventy years, or an indexation of pensions to consumer
prices rather than wages, are refused at the moment. Furthermore, a more
pronounced shift toward a funded system as discussed in Siebert (1998) or
Bo ¨rsch-Supan (1998) is currently opposed in the political arena.
14.2.9 Italy
The Italian pension system is the most expensive old age security sys-
tem, in terms of GDP, among OECD countries and has expanded rapidly
over the last thirty years. Although the average pension beneﬁt relative to
per capita income is broadly in line with those of other EU countries, there
is a disproportionate number of pensions relative to population. This, in
turn, reﬂects the relatively high proportion of persons over the age of sixty;
the use of pensions to substitute for passive income support to the unem-
ployed; and favorable access to early retirement through seniority pensions
(until recently, workers could retire after thirty-ﬁve years of work irrespec-
tive of age; in the public sector, even earlier). Institutionally, the Italian
pension system is extremely fragmented, administered by funds diﬀeren-
tiated for professional categories (Klammer 1997). This translates into sig-
niﬁcant inequalities across groups, particularly with more favorable treat-
ment for public-sector employees and the self-employed.
In the early 1990s, a number of minor reforms were undertaken; the
most important was probably the suspension of the link between nominal
wage growth and pension beneﬁts (1992). In August 1995, however, a ma-
jor reform package passed Parliament (the Dini reform); it provided the
following (OECD 2000c; Reynaud and Hege 1996):
● A shift from an earnings-based system to a contributions-based sys-
tem, with contributions over a lifetime period capitalized on the basis
of nominal GDP growth;
● A ﬂexible retirement age (ﬁfty-seven to sixty-ﬁve years), with a link
between beneﬁts and residual life expectancy at retirement age;
● A phased increase in contributions required for a seniority pension
from thirty-ﬁve to forty years;
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● Fiscal incentives for stimulating the growth of private pension funds.
As to the implementation of this major institutional reform, there is a
transition period in which the old system and the new system coexist. New
entrants into the labor market fall under the new system, and workers with
more than eighteen years of contributions remain in the old one. To the
intermediate group applies a weighted average of the old and the new for-
mulas.
Although the 1995 reform represents an important improvement toward
a more uniform and ﬁnancially viable system, there remains a signiﬁcant
shortfall between beneﬁts and contributions. In order to achieve the short-
term goal of stabilizing pension spending as a percentage of GDP, the
so-called Prodi amendments were introduced in November 1997. These
included an acceleration of the harmonization of the public and private
pension regimes and of the rules for a number of special schemes; a tight-
ening of the conditions governing access to seniority pensions; and a grad-
ual increase in the contribution rates for the self-employed from 16 to 19
percent of earnings by 2014. Despite signiﬁcant progress in reform in the
1990s, the worsening of the situation over the coming thirty years is miti-
gated only to a limited extent. This is partly due to the long transition
period; and the retirement age remains among the lowest in the OECD.
14.2.10 Japan
The Japanese pension system (OECD 1997d, 121ﬀ.) consists of a major
pillar of funded occupational pension schemes; 90 percent of private enter-
prises provide some form of occupational beneﬁts at retirement, whether
in form of lump-sum payments or in form of pensions. The public pension
system is PAYGO ﬁnanced although it has been held in surplus over an
extended period of time, which resulted in the accumulation of assets
amounting to some 30 percent of GDP. The system consists of two tiers.
The ﬁrst is a ﬂat rate system that covers, in principle, all residents between
the ages of twenty and sixty (the National Pension) Beneﬁts are propor-
tional to the number of years of contributions (minimum twenty-ﬁve years,
maximum forty years). In the second tier, contributions and pensions are
related to earnings (the Employees Pension). It is possible to contract out
into certain occupational pension plans. Pensions are indexed to net
wages, and the statutory retirement age is sixty years.
Against the background of the extremely rapid aging of the Japanese
population, a massive deterioration of the ﬁscal balance of the public pen-
sion system (or a drastic increase of contribution rates to approximately
35 percent from 17.35 percent today) was to be expected. As a reaction to
the deteriorating prospects of the system, the pension system was revised
in 1994 (Kihara 1998; Takayama 1995).
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will be raised from sixty to sixty-ﬁve over the period from 2001 to
2013 for men and over the period from 2006 to 2018 for women.19
● The indexation was changed from gross wages to net wages.
● A one percent special contribution rate was applied to the semi-
annual bonus payments, which had not been subject to contribu-
tions before.
● The increase in the contribution rate, which is scheduled to take place
every ﬁve years, was increased from 2.2 percentage points to 2.5 per-
centage points.
● Various measures aimed at promoting delayed retirement were intro-
duced.
As a result of these measures, it was expected that the contribution rate
from the year 2025 onward could be lowered from 35 percent to 30 per-
cent. However, a revision in underlying assumptions about birth rates and
life expectancy resulted in a revised estimate of the contribution rate neces-
sary to balance the system in the long term—an estimate that is very close
to the 35 percent estimated before the reform (Kihara 1998).
A further reform package, the 1999 reform plan, was enacted in March
2000 (OECD 2000a). The bill aims to cut beneﬁts by 20 percent when the
measures are fully eﬀective; these measures include the following:
● A reduction of Employees Pension beneﬁts by 5 percent,
● A switch to inﬂation indexation for beneﬁts from the National and
Employees Pensions for those aged sixty-ﬁve or older,
● A stepwise increase in the retirement age from sixty to sixty-ﬁve for
the Employees Pension, and
● The introduction of contributions on wage income for those aged
sixty-ﬁve to seventy and a partial cut of their beneﬁts according to
their earned incomes.
Inaddition,theﬁnancialresourcesoftheNationalPensionwillbestrength-
ened by a rise in the share of the government subsidy from one-third to
one-half by 2004.
Despite this second major reform in ﬁve years, beneﬁts remain largely
underfunded given current rates of contribution; further reform is neces-
sary to avoid a sizeable increase in the contribution rate. Many proposals
have already been advanced, but there is strong opposition in the political
arena to the introduction of funded elements.
14.2.11 The Netherlands
The Dutch pension system consists of a PAYGO ﬁnanced public pen-
sion scheme that secures a universal basic pension; an extremely well-
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19. For details of the rules concerning retirement age, see Takayama (1995, 52).developed occupational pension sector; and, in addition, voluntary retire-
ment saving. The public old age pension (Algemeene Onderdomswet, or
AOW) is part of a broader social security scheme that also insures against
nursing care and disability. To those who have reached the age of sixty-
ﬁve it pays a ﬂat rate pension beneﬁt set at 70 percent (100 percent for a
married couple) of the statutory minimum wage. The full rate is contingent
on forty years of contributions. The beneﬁt is reduced by 2 percent for
each full year a person was not insured (Bedee et al. 1995, 268). The AOW
pension beneﬁts amounted to 5.5 percent of GDP in 1996 (Hetzel 1997),
and they are PAYGO ﬁnanced by contributions that are levied on the ﬁrst
income bracket of the tax code at the rate of 15.4 percent (1997).
The second pillar consists of funded occupational pension schemes that
have developed over a long period. Probably as a consequence (in part) of
the fact that the replacement rate under the public pension scheme falls
sharply with increasing income, the second pillar covers virtually the entire
labor force (83 percent). This is highly unusual because provision is volun-
tary. In most countries where provision is voluntary, coverage of occupa-
tional pension schemes tends to peak at around 50 percent (Davis 1996).
Most pension plans are of the DB type, usually designed to replace 70
percent of ﬁnal salary at the age of sixty-ﬁve together with the public pen-
sion, and 90 percent of pensioners receive inﬂation protection.20 To in-
crease labor mobility, there is implemented a kind of clearinghouse that
makes transfers between DB plans straightforward. The occupational pen-
sion funds have accumulated a huge amount of assets representing nearly
100 percent of GDP. Additional individual retirement saving is of rela-
tively little importance, although there are quite signiﬁcant tax incentives.
In the recent discussions on reforming social security, the main focus in
the Netherlands has been on cutting down on expenditures for disability
insurance that, due to extremely generous rules, had virtually exploded
during the 1980s (OECD 1991), with the result that 15 percent of the labor
force received disability beneﬁts at the beginning of the 1990s (Neue
Zu ¨rcher Zeitung [NZZ] 1993). In 1993, disability beneﬁts were reduced
and eligibility criteria tightened.
With respect to old age pensions, there recently have been only minor
changes. Notwithstanding, contribution rates to the public scheme are
planned to be held at around 15 percent. The government counts on im-
proved macroeconomic performance in general and on an increase of the
labor force participation ratio (which is extremely low by international
standards) in particular, in order to ﬁnance the expected rising pension
expenditure due to the aging of the population. Moreover, the beneﬁt lev-
20. This is also unusual. In most countries with DB plans, inﬂation protection is incom-
plete or partial, and as a result, pensions often fall sharply in real terms over time (Davis
1996, 2).
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of the active generations, because statutory minimum wages are expected
to lag behind average incomes. Any resulting deﬁcit in the public pension
scheme is planned to be covered by tax revenues. As for the occupational
pension schemes, beneﬁt calculations are envisaged to replace 70 percent
of average incomes over the whole career rather than 70 percent of the last
earned wage. The main objective of recent reforms has been to improve
the portability of pensions in order to increase labor mobility.
14.2.12 New Zealand
In New Zealand, public pensions are ﬂat rate beneﬁts that are not means
tested and that are paid from general tax revenues. The system works un-
der the label “New Zealand Superannuation.” Since 1994, beneﬁts have
been diﬀerentiated according to household and marital status (NZZ 1994).
In order to raise revenues in the process of ﬁscal consolidation, a surtax of
20 percent had been introduced in 1985 on additional retirement income
exceeding a certain limit. In 1992, the surtax rate was increased to 25
percent and the limit was nearly halved, which aggravated the detrimental
incentive eﬀects implied by this rule. The tax surcharge was removed in
1997. From 1990 to 1993, the beneﬁts that are normally adjusted for inﬂa-
tion remained nominally unchanged with the result of a real decrease in
the beneﬁt levels.
Despite a relatively low level of beneﬁts at present (public pension bene-
ﬁts in 1994 amounted to 5 percent of GDP in 1997, well below the OECD
average), the rapid aging of the population will put a considerable strain
on public ﬁnances. As one reaction, a gradual increase in the statutory
retirement age from sixty to sixty-ﬁve years over the 1992–2001 period has
been legislated.
In 1997, a major reform proposal was voted down by an overwhelming
majority of 92.4 percent of the voters (Hall 1997). The reform essentially
planned to replace the state pension with a compulsory private insurance
scheme, in which 8 percent of taxable income would have been set aside
in individual long-term saving accounts until a target sum (NZ$ 120,000)
was reached in order to buy an annuity on retirement. The government
would have supplemented the amount if the target was not met, but there
would have been neither government guarantees nor indexation. The result
would have been a decrease in government pension outlays to 2 percent
of GDP in the long run. However, with the old system now remaining in
place, an increase to 12 percent of GDP is still to be expected (The Econo-
mist 1997).
14.2.13 Spain
The public pension system in Spain is part of a more general social
security scheme that also includes support for survivors, the disabled,
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wages, of which 4.7 percent is paid by employees. The share of contribu-
tions that goes to old-age pensions is not published separately. The system
is extremely generous (OECD 1996a, 87): It delivers the highest income
replacement ratio in the EU after Greece (nearly 100 percent after contri-
butions and taxes). Pensions are indexed to consumer prices.
Fiscal imbalances have led to subsequent reforms that partially rectiﬁed
the problems for a limited period of time (OECD 1997c, 70). In the second
half of the 1980s, beneﬁt criteria were tightened with an increase in the
minimum contribution period from ten to ﬁfteen years, and pensions be-
gan to be assessed on the last eight rather than the last two years’ earnings.
Since 1988, old age pensions (in addition to the public pension system)
can be obtained through participation in private pension funds, an ar-
rangement promoted by the tax code. Because they have been introduced
only recently, pension funds are still relatively spare, although they are
growing rapidly (Stapf 1996; OECD 1996a, 79). The volume of assets
amounts to approximately 5 percent of GDP.
In 1995, a reform concept known as the Toledo Pact envisaged only
minor changes (Engler 1997), including an institutional separation of the
diﬀerent branches of social security; an increase in the number of years on
which the calculation of pensions is based, from eight to ﬁfteen; and a
change in the pattern of the accrual rate over the time of contribution, a
(minor) step toward a more actuarially fair scheme that also reduces incen-
tives to retire early.21 Another important change is that the ﬁnancing of
noncontributory pensions is no longer to be made from contributions but
from general tax revenues by the year 2000. Any resulting surplus in the
social security system shall be used to build up a reserve fund.
14.2.14 Sweden
The Swedish public pension system22 consists of two pillars, a ﬂat rate
basic pension and an income-related supplementary pension (ATP). The
system works primarily on a PAYGO basis, although there have been sur-
pluses accumulated in the past amounting to some 35 percent of GDP (by
1994). Discussions about the reform of the system are old. In 1994, a major
reform proposal was principally agreed upon, although the speciﬁc details
of the report had not been decided at that time; and it was only at the
beginning of that year that the government and opposition parties agreed
on the introduction of the new system (Handelsblatt 1998; Frankfurter
Allegemeine Zeitung [FAZ] 1998). The dominant feature of the 1994 pro-
posal was the improvement of actuarial fairness (only 25 percent of the
21. An increase in the minimum pension in 2000, however, works in the opposite direction
(OECD 2000b).
22. This section draws on OECD (1995b, 1997b) and Persson (1998).
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the old system). The new system is to be phased-in over a period of twenty
years. Its main features are the following:
● The ﬂat rate basic pension is gradually reeled in as the earnings-
related pension exceeds a certain threshold.
● Earnings-related pensions are based on lifetime income rather than
on the best ﬁfteen years’ income, which was the case under the old
system.
● Pensions are indexed to inﬂation, with a reduction in the indexing
factor when real GDP growth is below a certain norm (1.6 percent)
and an increase when growth exceeds that norm.
● The oﬃcial retirement age remains sixty-ﬁve, but earlier retirement
from the age of sixty-one onward and later retirement (with no upper
age limit) is possible with an actuarial adjustment of the pension.
● Pensions will be linked to life expectancy at retirement.
● The funded element of the system will be strengthened: 2.5 percentage
points of the contribution rate (which is 18.5 percent of wages) will
be put into individual accounts, to be managed upon the guidelines
of the contributor.
● Contributions that formerly were paid by employers only (since 1995,
employees have contributed at a rate of 1 percent) are shared equally
between employers and employees in the new system. The extra bur-
den on workers is compensated by income tax reductions.
14.2.15 Switzerland
In Switzerland, the three-pillar system of old age income provision has a
long tradition. The system consists of a government-run old age insurance
program, Alters- und Hinterlassen enversicherung (AHV), which is ﬁ-
nanced on a PAYGO basis;23 obligatory occupational pension schemes on
a funded basis; and voluntary saving promoted by preferential tax treat-
ment.
The public pension, AHV, is ﬁnanced by contributions by every person
over eighteen years of age at a rate of 4.2 percent of all earned income.
Contributions are paid equally by employees and employers. Since 1998,
spouses who are not in the labor force have also had to contribute and are,
from the year 2005 onward, entitled to a pension at the age of sixty-four.
There is also a contribution from the federal budget amounting to about
20 percent of expenditures (Rechsteiner 1996, 376).
A minimum contribution is set at 390 francs (Fr) per year; an upper
limit does not exist. By contrast, for the resulting beneﬁts there is an upper
23. The AHV consists of assets amounting to one year of expenditure (Ausgleichsfonds),
however (Gu ¨nthardt 1997).
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minimum pensions are Fr 995 and Fr 1,493, respectively (Ahfeldt 1997).
Pensions are adjusted according to the average of a wage index and the
consumer price index. The statutory retirement age is sixty-ﬁve for men
and, since recently, for women as well (Berger 1997).
Because the public pension system is designed to provide only a ﬂoor
to retirement income, the second pillar was made compulsory after a 1985
referendum. It requires employers to insure their employees with a pension
scheme and to pay at least half of the contributions, which amount to 10
percent of the wage bill (Brestel 1998). Although occupational pensions
before the introduction of the obligatory second pillar were often lost when
the employer was changed, the contributions are now paid into personal
accounts that belong to the individual worker. The funds collected in the
second-pillar pension schemes amounted to roughly 90 percent of GDP
in 1995 and are increasing rapidly.
Due to the enormous funded part of the old age pension system, the
problems with the aging of the population are limited compared to other
OECD countries. However, the AHV, which is PAYGO ﬁnanced, will run
progressively into a deﬁcit and needs additional ﬁnancing in the medium
to long term (NZZ 1998) in the absence of other reform measures. A re-
cent reform proposal includes, most importantly, restrictions on beneﬁts
for survivors; the harmonization of the retirement ages for men and
women by the year 2009 combined with a general increase in ﬂexibility of
the retirement age; and an increase in subsidies from general tax revenues
(NZZ 2000).
14.2.16 United Kingdom
The public pension system in the United Kingdom originates from the
Beveridgean idea of a comprehensive National Insurance (providing both
a basic ﬂat rate beneﬁt in the case of unemployment, sickness, or disability,
and an old age pension) that is ﬁnanced by ﬂat rate contributions (Disney
and Johnson 1998). Additional private insurance would be left to the indi-
vidual’s choice. In the decades after World War II, a system developed in
which ﬂat rate beneﬁts were combined with earnings-related contributions,
which eventually led to the demand for an earnings-related component of
pensions. As a result, in 1978 the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme
(SERPS) was introduced. An essential feature of the arrangement was the
contracting-out principle, which allows one to opt for contributing to an
approved company pension scheme in exchange for a reduction in the con-
tribution rate to the National Insurance. This should be viewed against
the background of the time of introduction of SERPS, when half of the
workforce was already covered by occupational pension schemes.
Further reforms, mainly the return to consumer price indexation (1979)
and a downgrading of SERPS beneﬁts (1986), made the public pension
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run). In addition, the range of pension plans entitled to the contracted-
out status was expanded to include DC plans in order to make occupa-
tional pension schemes more attractive, especially for smaller companies.
Moreover, the possibility of opting for individual retirement saving ac-
counts (Personal Pensions) was introduced. As a result, since the mid-
1980s the number of persons remaining in SERPS has declined to about
one-fourth of the workforce.
The problem for the government with this development has been that
contributions to the PAYGO system were reduced through increased con-
tracting-out. An estimated 2 percentage points of the increase in National
Insurance contributions that was necessary to ﬁnance the current expendi-
ture on SERPS pensions can be attributed to this factor (Disney and John-
son 1998).24
In 1995, a reform bill was designed primarily to tighten the regulation
of occupational pension plans, but contained some notable components
relevant to the future prospects of the public pension system as well. First,
the pensionable age of women will be raised gradually between the years
2010 and 2020 to equal that of men, at sixty-ﬁve. Second, a technical re-
form of the calculation of SERPS beneﬁts and the abolition of a guaran-
teed minimum pension will produce a large amount of saving in future
government expenditures.
Due to (a) the relatively small market share of PAYGO ﬁnanced public
pensions, which consist of the relatively low basic pensions and provide
about 15 percent of average earnings for an individual (Dilnot et al. 1994),
(b) a small and declining portion of earnings-related pensions; and (c) a
relatively benign demographic structure (compared to that of other coun-
tries), the problems of the public pension schemes in the United Kingdom
are projected to be minor. Provided that the basic state pension continues
to be indexed to prices, no increase in contribution rates will be necessary
(OECD 1994b).
Recent reforms by the Blair government have concentrated on distribu-
tional aspects and on restoring public conﬁdence in private pension
schemes. Much of that conﬁdence had been lost due to high management
costs and to the inappropriate sales tactics of some of the providers, who
lured ﬁnancially unsophisticated workers into unsuitable pension schemes.
A minimum income guarantee was introduced in April 1999 that is means
tested and linked to earnings. From April 2002, SERPS will be replaced
by a new State Second Pension (S2P), which will be more generous to low-
income earners and will be changed into a ﬂat rate beneﬁt in April 2007.
As concerns the funded pillar, a new kind of standardized individual DC
24. At the same time, the obligations in the future—and hence the future contribution
rates—decreased.
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April 2001.
14.2.17 United States
In the United States, the central part of the public pension system is the
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), which is known
as Social Security. This is a DB pension scheme ﬁnanced by a payroll tax
of currently 12.4 percent on a PAYGO basis. The system covers, in prin-
ciple, every person in employment (except part of the public sector and
domestics with incomes of less than $1,000 per year). There is an upper
limit to average monthly earnings subject to the payroll tax. Beneﬁts are
calculated on the basis of the best thirty-ﬁve years of the career and are
indexed to the consumer price index. The beneﬁts formula contains a quite
signiﬁcant element of redistribution, so that low-income wage earners re-
ceive a retirement return on their Social Security taxes at more than triple
the rate of high-income wage earners (Kuttner 1998).
The OASDI is required to be ﬁnancially balanced over a period of sev-
enty-ﬁve years. In 1983, after a commission chaired by Alan Greenspan
testiﬁed to a severe long-term ﬁnancial disequilibrium, a reform was car-
ried out that included a slight cut in the inﬂation adjustment formula,
an increase in the taxable income base, a gradual raising of the statutory
retirement age by two years to sixty-seven beginning in the year 2000, and
the taxation of Social Security beneﬁts to retirees with abundant other in-
comes. Incentives to retire early were also reduced and obstacles to work-
ing longer years removed (Lumsdaine and Wise 1994, 21). In addition, the
Social Security tax rate was gradually raised from 10.8 to 12.4 percent.
In combination, these measures not only restored the short-term sol-
vency of the system but generated a surplus of contributions and a return
on assets of the system higher than pension outlays. As a result, assets are
accumulated in a trust fund, the volume of which is expected to peak in
the year 2021 (Kijakazi, Primus, and Greenstein 1998).25 From that year
on, expenditures on Social Security beneﬁts will surpass revenues so that
the trust fund assets will progressively be run down from the year 2032
onward, until (according to recent projections) the system becomes (par-
tially) insolvent. In contrast to the assessment of the Greenspan commis-
sion, the 1983 reforms have apparently not been suﬃcient to stabilize the
system. There is still a signiﬁcant deﬁcit diagnosed when ﬁnances are cal-
culated over the next seventy-ﬁve years.26
25. The amount of assets at the peak is estimated at around $3 trillion, about 35 percent
of GDP in 1998 (The Economist 1998a).
26. The unfunded obligations of OASDI are an estimated $9 trillion, 106 percent of this
year’s GDP (Mitchell 1998). The main reason for the revision has been unanticipated weak
wage growth in the decade between 1983 and 1993. It must be noted that the calculations
are now based on assumptions about real growth in the economy that are extremely moderate
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implicit in current rules, an Advisory Council was formed to evaluate the
situation and possible reforms of the system. The committee came up with
a number of reform proposals (Gramlich 1998), ranging from minor
changes in beneﬁt schedules and contribution rates (the ﬁnancial balance
would be restored mainly through improved investment of Social Security
funds) to a wide-ranging reform in which the present DB system would be
replaced with a large-scale DC scheme, similar to the Chilean model.
Entering the discussion very recently has been the proposal of a biparti-
san working group, which essentially plans to divert 2.0 percentage points
of the current 12.4 percent payroll tax into individual saving accounts (The
Economist 1998b). To secure the system’s solvency despite the reduced
contributions that ﬁnance current pension expenditure, the retirement age
would rise to seventy by 2029, and the early retirement age (at which a
reduced pension can be received) would rise to sixty-ﬁve by 2017. In addi-
tion, some of the expected surplus in the federal budget could be used to
ﬁnance the transition. As a result, the transition to a system comprising
a signiﬁcant funded pillar could be managed without a (Social Security)
tax hike.
Although a major overhaul of the public pension scheme has not yet
been decided, the administration has progressively increased incentives to
save for retirement on a voluntary basis (Eckhardt 1998). Contributions
to individual retirement accounts are tax deductible up to a certain limit
(currently $2,000 per year). So-called 401(k) accounts (named after the
respective paragraph in the income tax code) are tax-favored saving ac-
counts for which the amount of individual saving is matched by an em-
ployer contribution.
14.3 Other Parts of the World
14.3.1 Central and Eastern Europe
The formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope inherited a comprehensive unfunded pension system. Pension expen-
diture in percent of GDP has been quite high in many countries and has
increased rapidly during the early years of transition, partly due to the
fact that the necessary reduction of the workforce often took place through
e a r l yr e t i r e m e n t .H i g hp e n s i o ne x p e n d i t u r ei sr e ﬂ e c t e di nh i g hr a t e so f
social security contributions, often at about 50 percent of gross wages
(Holzmann 1997).27
(1.6 percent annual real GDP growth, compared to about 3.0 percent over the last seventy-
ﬁve years).
27. In most countries, the lion’s share (if not all) of the contributions is paid by the em-
ployer.
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was characterized by relatively low statutory retirement ages (Cichon, Ha-
gemejer, and Ruck 1997, 16): Men generally were entitled to receive pen-
sions at the age of sixty, women at the age of ﬁfty-ﬁve (except in Poland,
where retirement ages were sixty-ﬁve and sixty, respectively). Typical qual-
ifying conditions were twenty-ﬁve years of contributions for men and
twenty for women. Beneﬁt formulas normally used a ﬁxed percentage of
reference income for the required minimum number of years, plus an incre-
ment for additional years of contributions. Actual replacement rates were
usually relatively high and could reach 75 percent of the reference income
for persons with forty years of contributions and ﬁfty percent for as little
as twenty years of contributions. In the early years of transition, however,
due to incomplete indexation, the real value of pensions declined markedly
in a number of countries, with the result that despite high pension expendi-
ture in terms of GDP, a signiﬁcant share of pensioners receive income
below the oﬃcial poverty lines (Holzmann 1997, 16).
Initial reform considerations were geared toward a ﬁnancial redressing
of the unfunded schemes and an elimination of the main distortions found
in the traditional measures. These considerations included an increase in
the statutory retirement age, an extension of the reference period on which
beneﬁts are calculated, a reduction in the replacement rate, higher deac-
crual factors for early retirement, price instead of wage indexation, elimi-
nation of group privileges, and consistent tax treatment of contributions
and beneﬁts.
However, none of the reform countries has successfully implemented a
consistent reform package along these lines that would have put the public
pension scheme on sound ﬁnancial footing in the short and medium terms.
In most countries, only minor adjustments or discretionary changes have
been made.28
Although progress in reforming the PAYGO ﬁnanced pension systems
along traditional lines proved to be diﬃcult, given that such measures nec-
essarily mean a cutback on acquired rights for important segments of the
population, the focus increasingly shifted toward the possibility of a major
systemic reform. In particular, a move toward funded schemes through the
introduction of a multipillar pension system as proposed by the World
Bank (1994) has gained popularity. In a number of countries, pension re-
form plans that include (partial) shifts to funded pension schemes have
been proposed, and in an increasing number of them—including Estonia,
Latvia, Hungary, and Poland, among others—the implementation is pre-
pared in earnest or has even already begun. The preparation of reform
plans has been assisted by the World Bank (Eesti Pank 1998), which has
28. For a country-by-country overview of pension reforms undertaken or under discussion,
see Cichon, Hagemejer, and Ruck (1997, 22).
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1998). In the remainder of this section, recent developments in the three
major countries of the region are described in more detail.
Czech Republic
The main pillar of the Czech pension system is a public PAYGO ﬁ-
nanced system comprising (since 1996) ﬂat-rate and earnings-related com-
ponents. In order to provide additional retirement income, the establish-
ment of private pension funds (for which pensioners’ investment decisions
are restricted) was made possible as early as 1993. Participation in private
insurance schemes is voluntary but is supported by state contributions.
Although public pension expenditure is relatively modest (compared to
that of other Central European countries): at 9 percent of GDP (OECD
1996e), the rate of contribution to the public pension scheme at 26 percent
is still high by international standards and is expected to increase due to a
deteriorating depending ratio. In reaction to this fact, it was decided in a
1995 reform bill that the retirement age would gradually be increased from
sixty to sixty-two years for men, and for women, from the original ﬁfty-
three-to ﬁfty-seven-year range (based on the number of children) to a
range of ﬁfty-seven to sixty-one years by the year 2006. Additional mea-
sures include a gradual increase (from ten to thirty) in the number of active
years on which the calculation of beneﬁts is based, the introduction of
more formal indexing rules,29 and perhaps most importantly, the strength-
ening of the link between contributions and beneﬁts. The pension reform
debate has recently begun again, and focuses on the introduction of an
additional mandatory, fully funded tier.
Hungary
In Hungary,30 the National Pension Fund established in 1991 provided
pensions on a PAYGO basis. A second voluntary tier, introduced in 1995,
was based on mutual funds. The aging of the population, declining em-
ployment rates, and a large and rising share of the workforce in early retire-
ment and disability pensions has inclined the government to make a num-
ber of reforms in recent years. These reforms have included a broadening
of the contribution base and the raising of the statutory retirement age
from the original sixty and ﬁfty-ﬁve for men and women, respectively, to
a uniform sixty-two years by 2009. The latest reform package also changes
29. Contributions are indexed to average wages and beneﬁts to the consumer price index
and wages. The adjustment of pensions to developments in prices still has a signiﬁcant discre-
tionary element. According to the reform bill, pensions are to be adjusted when consumer
price increases have accumulated to 5 percent, and increases in wages are to be taken into
account. In order to generate saving in government expenditures in the face of a deteriorating
economic environment, however, it was decided that pensions not be raised before a rise in
prices of at least 10 percent occurred (Lodahl and Schrooten 1998, 109).
30. This section draws on OECD (1997, 136) and Cichon, Hagemejer, and Ruck (1997, 23).
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wages and consumer prices (the so-called Swiss index).
The above changes in the PAYGO scheme are expected to lead to a
signiﬁcant surplus in the ﬁnances of the system at today’s contribution rate
(30 percent) in the short to medium term (although a deﬁcit after the year
2030 is still to be expected). These use of these surpluses is planned to
help ﬁnance the transition to a more equitable and ﬁnancially sustainable
three-tier system, which was begun at the beginning of 1998. The new
system consists of a scaled-down PAYGO scheme, complemented by a
compulsory, privately managed, fully funded second tier and a voluntary,
fully funded third tier.
In the new system, the PAYGO tier will be DB and earnings related,
providing a replacement rate of 40 percent after thirty-ﬁve years of contri-
butions. It will be ﬁnanced by three-fourths of the total present contribu-
tions. The remaining fourth will be paid into the individual retirement
saving scheme. The new system will be compulsory for new entrants into
the labor market, whereas existing employees below forty-seven years of
age can opt for either the new multitier system or the modiﬁed old pen-
sion system.
Poland
The Polish public pension system underwent a major revision in 1993,
when the system was split into two tiers (Heinrich et al. 1996, 87). One
tier provides a basic ﬂat-rate pension amounting to 24 percent of the aver-
age gross wage; the second tier pays a beneﬁt related to the individual’s
years of contribution and his or her earnings in the ﬁve best of the fourteen
years preceding retirement. Pension beneﬁts are taxable. Together with the
reform of the institutional characteristics of the pension system, the bene-
ﬁts level was raised in order to compensate for incomplete indexation in
the preceding years, and a regular adjustment to changes in average wages
was introduced. Currently, public pensions are (on average) as high as 70
percent of the average wage. As a result of the combination of a high
beneﬁts level and a rising number of pensioners,31 public pension expendi-
ture has increased strongly and has reached 16 percent of GDP, compared
to an average of 10 percent in the OECD countries.
The high ﬁnancial burden of the existing pension system and the mount-
ing doubts about its viability in the future led to persistent demand for
further reform. Recently, a rather sweeping reform32 has been legislated
31. Although the statutory retirement ages of sixty-ﬁve and sixty for men and women,
respectively, are relatively high compared to those of other Central European countries, the
actual retirement age is much lower due to early retirement.
32. For a detailed description of the reform and its rationale, see World Bank (1997, 72)
and Loboda and Szalkiewicz-Zaradzka (1998).
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gradually to replace the present social security system with a system con-
sisting of two mandatory pillars: the ﬁrst ﬁnanced on a PAYGO, DC basis
(as has been introduced recently in Latvia), and the second fully funded
and privately managed. In addition, retirement income is to be supplied
by voluntary individual saving. As for the ﬁrst pillar, beneﬁts are calculated
according to past contributions and the life expectancy at retirement,
which eﬀectively corrects for early or late retirement. In light of experience
in Latvia, however, the statutory retirement ages will be kept at present
levels. Twenty percent of the current social security contributions (9 per-
cent of wages) will be paid into the second tier of the system, which con-
sists of individual accounts in privately managed but regulated pension
funds.
The system will be introduced gradually. Workers over age ﬁfty remain
in the old system, workers under age thirty will contribute to the new sys-
tem, and workers between the ages of thirty and ﬁfty may contribute to
the second tier of the new system on a voluntary basis. A deﬁcit in the
current pension scheme, which results from the eﬀective 20 percent reduc-
tion in contributions from younger workers to the PAYGO system, is
planned to be ﬁnanced from the general budget using receipts from priva-
tization.
14.3.2 East Asia
East Asia is both the most rapidly aging and the most rapidly growing
region (James 1997, 362). In many countries the aging of the population
combines with the erosion of the extended family, and their governments
will have to act quickly to meet these challenges. Currently, public pension
schemes based on the principle of PAYGO ﬁnancing are virtually nonexis-
tent in East Asia. Although in some countries (such as Singapore and
Malaysia) retirement saving is mandatory, and in the Philippines, there is
a relatively well-developed two-pillar pension system (Asher 1998), most
countries (including China and Indonesia) still must build up formal uni-
versal pension schemes. Recent steps have been dominated by eﬀorts to
extend the coverage of occupational pension schemes on a DC basis (Pia-
zolo 1998). A special case that deserves particular attention is China,
where the problems of the pension system interlink with the challenge of
structural adjustments in the state-enterprise sector (World Bank 1997).
14.3.3 Latin America
Public pension systems in Latin America have traditionally been ﬁ-
nanced on a PAYGO basis. These systems have fared particularly bad in
an international comparison. They did not deliver what they had prom-
ised, and although there had been cuts in beneﬁts and rising contribution
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system, for example, was virtually bankrupt in 1991 (Queisser 1998).
In view of the deteriorating performance of the PAYGO schemes and
the prospects for a further worsening of the situation, an increasing num-
ber of Latin American governments decided to implement major systemic
reforms, partly along the lines of the Chilean model and partly in accor-
dance with the World Bank’s three-pillar approach. In any case, the intro-
duction of a signiﬁcant element of pension prefunding was at the heart of
the reforms.
The Chilean reform of 1981 is both well known and well documented
(e.g., Edwards 1998; Vittas 1995). Essentially, the reform meant to privat-
ize old age pensions. The former PAYGO system—which was ineﬃcient,
distributively unjust, and basically insolvent—was replaced with a man-
datory system based on individual capitalization, fully funded, privately
managed, and operating on a DC basis. The government guarantees a
minimum pension that is deﬁned relative to the average yield of the pen-
sion funds. Pension claims that had been accumulated under the old sys-
tem were recognized by issuance of government bonds.
Although some weaknesses have been identiﬁed, including a lack of
coverage, problems of moral hazard among low-wage workers, and high
administrative costs, the Chilean reform has been widely judged a success.
This may have contributed to the spread of the idea among an increasing
number of Latin American countries that public pension system reforms
should tend toward more funding. Major reforms were undertaken or are
still underway in Argentina (1994), Bolivia (underway), Colombia (1994),
Mexico (1992, 1995), and Uruguay (1996). Other countries, including Bra-
zil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay, are en-
gaged in serious discussions. In all cases the reforms involved setting up a
fully funded saving plan while continuing to pay the pensions of retirees
and of workers who do not switch, and issuing bonds recognizing the ac-
crued entitlements of workers who do switch (James 1997, 363). However,
the reforms in the individual countries diﬀer signiﬁcantly in a number of
key respects,33 including the character of the funded pillar (mandatory or
voluntary), the mode of ﬁnancing of the new system, the size of any re-
maining PAYGO pillar, the existence and level of a guaranteed minimum
pension, the size and ﬁnancing of the transition obligation, and the details
of the regulatory framework. The variations in recent approaches to old
age pension reform in Latin America will give an opportunity to gain fur-
ther empirical evidence on the shape of a well-designed pension reform.
33. For a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of the reforms and of problems
associated with the various pension systems, see Aiyer (1997) and Mitchell and Barreto
(1997).
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There is a clear tendency toward reforms that increase the degree of
prefunding of pension obligations. Many countries have proceeded sig-
niﬁcantly along that route, whether through stronger funding of the public
pension schemes (Canada, Finland, Sweden, the United States) or through
strengthening the role of private occupational pensions (Australia, Den-
mark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom). These mea-
sures, which tend to lessen the burden on future generations, have resulted
in a burden today that is somewhat higher than it might have been without
such reforms, despite the fact that measures to restrain expenditure were
also taken. In some countries, contribution rates are raised beyond what
would be necessary, without increased funding; in other countries, subsi-
dies to the system from general tax revenues are increased. Another set
of industrial countries have conﬁned their reforms mainly to more-or-less
signiﬁcant adjustments to the prevailing PAYGO systems, without increas-
ing their funded elements (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Ja-
pan, New Zealand, Spain). The capacity of the conventional measures to
redress these systems in order to balance their ﬁnances in the long term
seems limited, however, for the following reasons:
● The increase in revenues through higher contribution rates or taxes is
obviously about to reach a ceiling in a number of countries, due to
the associated excess burdens caused by such policies and to rising
international tax competition.
● Lowering other public expenditures (e.g., on education or defense)
can contribute only partially, given the scope of the task.
● A marked increase in the retirement age can contribute signiﬁcantly,
b u ti sp o l i t i c a l l yd i ﬃcult to implement—especially in cases in which
high unemployment is eﬀectively pressing actual retirement age into
the opposite direction.
● The reduction in the beneﬁt level per retiree through lower pension
beneﬁts, lower indexation, higher taxing, or enhanced means testing
has been applied in recent reforms in various countries, but these mea-
sures can only mitigate some of the problems and are unlikely to put
the pension schemes on sound long-term ﬁscal footing.
Because an early move to increase funding can signiﬁcantly reduce the
burden that is to be borne when the strong cohorts retire, pension reform
in that direction should be part of a strategy to cope with the problems of
an aging population. The majority of Euro area countries in particular
have been lagging behind in that area until now. By increasing the capacity
to ﬁnance the transition, further consolidation of the general government
ﬁnances (excluding social security) can greatly contribute to the viability
Recent Developments in Old-Age Pension Systems 473of a major switch to funded pensions. Rectifying existing PAYGO schemes
(raising the retirement age, eliminating rewards for early retirement, down-
sizing beneﬁts) can be seen as the ﬁrst step toward developing a system
with a major funded pillar, and is needed to reduce the uncovered liabili-
ties and increase the relative attractiveness of a new system. Perhaps the
examples of more radical reforms in some future member countries of the
European Union in Central Europe can stimulate the discussion on more
decisive reforms within the Union itself.
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